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Transparency and Disclosure of Medical Errors:
It's the Right Thing to Do, So Why the
Reluctance?
BARBARA PHILLIPS-BUTE, J.D., PH.D.*
ABSTRACT
The medical and legal fields increasingly endorse transparency and
disclosure as a better way to handle unexpected medical outcomes which
result in harm to patients. Patients and doctors both say, at least in the
abstract, that they want honest interactions. Yet, in the aftermath of a
medical mistake, these conversations between doctors and patients rarely
occur. The legal protections offered by apology and disclosure statutes are
incomplete and do not offer adequate assurances to a physician who wants
to be forthcoming with a patient about a medical error. Yet, incomplete
disclosures may anger a patient and increase the risk of legal action.
Despite these obstacles, disclosure programs do exist which demonstrate
that it is possible to implement a process which reduces litigation and
associated expenses, increases patient satisfaction, and encourages the
transparency around systemic errors, and which allows for improved
patient safety measures to be implemented. This paper proposes that a
model for a disclosure program must provide adequate context and
additional legal protections for physicians in order to accomplish the shared
safety goals of patients, health care providers, and the general public.

* Barbara Phillips-Bute, J.D., Ph.D., Attorney and Mediator, 3737 Glenwood Avenue Suite
370, Raleigh, NC 27615. The author wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Jessica
Scott, M.D., J.D. and Aida Doss Havel, J.D.

333

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2014

1

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 3

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

334

[Vol. 35:333

INTRODUCTION

The Institute of Medicine (IOM) ignited a firestorm of controversy in
1999 when it published a report that shocked the medical community. The
IOM reported that medical errors are the eighth leading cause of mortality
in the country, responsible for as many as 98,000 deaths per year.' The
report found that the majority of these medical errors could be prevented by
improved systems, 2 but unless doctors and hospitals acknowledged and
disclosed these errors and near-misses, there would be no opportunity to
implement safer systems and policies.3 A national debate ensued about the
proper response to this crisis in health care and patient safety.
Following the report, a new era of patient safety efforts was launched,
and in 2001, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations instituted a disclosure requirement 4-this requirement was
simply a statement that patients should be informed about all outcomes of
care, including "unanticipated outcomes." 5
Although the disclosure
requirement did not specify the level of detail of disclosure or require that
patients be informed when a mistake had occurred, the professional ethos
of secrecy around harmful errors began to shift. Over the next decade, it
became increasingly difficult for health care providers to "delay, deny, and
defend," which had been the traditional way of dealing with medical errors
with the potential to lead to litigation.6 Although the organized medical
profession has acknowledged that providers have an ethical duty to disclose
harmful errors, this ethical obligation is not legally enforceable and has
been expressed in very general, even vague, ways.7 Since the 2001 report,
1. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 1
(Linda T. Kohn, Janet M. Corrigan & Molla S. Donaldson eds., 2000) [hereinafter To ERR IS
HUMAN].

2. Id. at 6.
3. See generally id.
4. JOINT COMMISSION

ON

ACCREDITATION

OF

HEALTHCARE

ORGANIZATIONS,

IMPROVING CARE IN THE ICU 19 (2004); JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF
HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS, COMPREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS:
THE OFFICIAL HANDBOOK RI-13 (2007) (requiring that patients and, when appropriate,
families are informed of all outcomes of care, treatment, and services under standard
RI.2.90).

5. Id.
6. See ROSEMARY GIBSON & JANARDAN PRASAD SINGH, WALL OF SILENCE: THE
UNTOLD STORY OF THE MEDICAL MISTAKES THAT KILL AND INJURE MILLIONS OF AMERICANS
9-10 (2003).

7. See generally Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Disclosing Harmful Medical Errors to
Patients, 356 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2713 (2007) [hereinafter Disclosing Harmful Medical

Errors].
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efforts to increase patient safety have been increasingly directed at
encouraging disclosure of errors and near-misses in order to understand
why the errors occurred and to design safer systems to prevent the
reoccurrence of errors.8 Safety improvements depend on the ability to learn
from errors and near-misses, which means they must first be acknowledged
with specificity.9
In addition to allowing patient safety measures to be implemented in
response to medical errors, disclosure has other tangible benefits to the
injured patient. The information allows a patient "to obtain timely and
appropriate treatment to correct problems" and to gather the "necessary
information to make informed decisions." 10 The IOM report and its
aftermath made clear that not only was there a crisis in patient safety but
also that patients who were injured by medical mistakes were not being
adequately informed, treated, or compensated."
Although rates of medical error are high, only 2-3% of patients
injured by medical mistakes file lawsuits, and of those, only half ever
receive compensation. 12 When a patient does receive compensation, it is
on average five years after the incident, often at a cost of well over
$100,000, and patients typically receive only half of the eventual awardwith the other half covering attorney's fees and costs. 13 Litigation in the
health care arena is an inefficient and time-consuming process that leaves
most patients who have experienced a poor outcome uncompensated. 14 Yet
when patients are faced with health care providers who do not provide
acknowledgement or explanations for unexpected medical outcomes,
litigation is often the only path open to patients who are trying to get
information about what happened to them."
There is an exorbitant

8. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 78-82 (2001).

9. See generally Richard C. Boothman et al., A Better Approach to Medical
Malpractice Claims? The University of Michigan Experience, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE SC. L.
125 (2009).
10. Elaine O'Connor et al., Disclosure of Patient Safety Incidents: A Comprehensive
Review, 22 INT'L J. FOR QUALITY HEALTH CARE 371, 373 (2010).
11. See generally To ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 1.
12. Michelle M. Mello et al., Who Pays for Medical Errors?An Analysis of Adverse
Event Costs, the MedicalLiability System, and Incentives for Patient Safety Improvement, 4
J.EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 835, 838 (2007).
13. David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors,and Compensation Payments in Medical
MalpracticeLitigation, 354 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2026-27 (2006).
14. Id. at 2026-27, 2031.
15. See generally id.
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overhead associated with this information-gathering process. For every
dollar in compensation, fifty-four cents goes to administrative expenses,
lawyers, experts, and costs, and 37% of claims eventually turn out not to
involve errors-which, of course, injured patients have no way of knowing
until someone with the necessary information talks to them.16
The driving force behind doctors' unwillingness to communicate with
patients about medical errors is presumably a concern about the
confidentiality and legal discoverability of the information they convey.
Doctors fear litigation and tend to overestimate the rate of medical
malpractice claims brought in response to errors. 17 Despite the low perincident rate of litigation, given the high frequency of medical errors, 7599% of physicians are sued at some point in their careers.18 Fear of
liability has been cited as the primary barrier to the development of patient
safety initiatives in hospitals. 19 Fear of litigation creates a culture of
secrecy and mistrust, and lack of disclosure creates frustrated and angry
patients who are more likely to engage in litigation.20 The anticipation of a
lawsuit creates a low tolerance for uncertainly about medical outcomes,
resulting in the practice of defensive medicine and driving up the costs of
health care for society in general. 2 1 The effect of the process of litigation
on physicians is to encourage them not to acknowledge mistakes and to
avoid talking to an injured patient at all.22
While the effects of medical errors can be devastating for patients and
their families, the effects of lawsuits on physicians is devastating as well.
Doctors are named individually in lawsuits under our current tort system
and are affected emotionally, financially, and professionally.23
Symptomatic reactions are common among physicians who have been sued

16. Id. at 2024.
17. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, OTA-H-602 27 (1994).

18. Anupam B. Jena et al., Malpractice Risk According to Physician Specialty, 365
NEW ENG. J. MED. 629, 629 (2011).

19. Boothman et al., supra note 9, at 131.
20. See Anna C. Mastroianni et al., The Flaws in State "Apology" and "Disclosure"
Laws Dilute Their Intended Impact on MalpracticeSuits, 29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1611, 1616
(2010).
21. See, e.g., Boothman et al., supra note 9, at 151-56 (examining the costs of litigation
from the plaintiff's and defendant's perspectives).
22. To ERR Is HUMAN, supra note 1, at 43.
23. Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Patients' and Physicians' Attitudes Regarding the
Disclosure of Medical Errors, 289 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1001, 1005-06 (2003) [hereinafter
Patients'andPhysicians'Attitudes].
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for malpractice, with 97% experiencing physical or emotional reactions.24
Doctors who have made an error experience diminished quality of life and
higher burnout.25 In addition, they may develop symptoms of depression
and decreased empathy with patients.26
Taken together, these findings suggest a system that does not work
well for either the patients, whose questions are not answered and whose
injuries are usually not addressed, or the health care providers, who feel
threatened and victimized by the litigation system. The current tort system
of medical malpractice claims has proven to be inefficient, expensive, and
contrary to the ultimate goal of better health care. The Joint Commission
on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations noted in 2005 that there is
a "fundamental dissonance between the medical liability system and the
patient safety movement."2 7
While the health care system has traditionally discouraged disclosures,
there is, nonetheless, a steady momentum toward programs that promote
transparency and full disclosure of medical errors in the United States and
28
in other western countries. A system that encourages medical disclosure
and transparency through a safe, supportive, and highly effective process
that addresses both the needs of the patients and the needs of the physician
can also serve the broader goals of increased patient safety. Concerns that
increased transparency around medical errors might result in increased
litigation have been argued vigorously, 29 but the data do not necessarily

24. Sara C. Charles, Charlene E. Pyskoty & Amy Nelson, Physician on Trial-SelfReported Reactions to Malpractice Trials, 148 W. J.MED. 358, 358 (1988).
25. See generally Collin P. West et al., Association of Perceived Medical Errors with
Resident Distress and Empathy: A Prospective Longitudinal Study, 296 J. AM. MED. Ass'N
1071 (2006).
26. Id. at 1071-72.
27. JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., HEALTHCARE AT A
CROSSROADS: STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING THE MEDICAL LIABILITY SYSTEM AND
PREVENTING PATIENT INJURY 4 (2005).

28. See, e.g., CanadianDisclosure Guidelines: Being Open with Patients andFamilies,
CANADIAN PATIENT SAFETY INSTITUTE (2011), available at http://www.patientsafetyinstitute

.ca/English/toolsResources/disclosure/Documents/CPSI%20Canadian%20Disclosure%20G
uidelines.pdf; Guidance on Open Disclosure Policies, HEALTH AND DISABILITY
COMMISSIONER (2009), available at http://www.hdc.org.nz/media/18328/guidance%20on
Being Open: Communicating
%20open%20disclosure%20policies%20dec%2009.pdf;

Patients Safety Incidents with Patients, Their Families and Careers, NATIONAL PATIENT
SAFETY AGENCY
(2009), available at http://www.nrls.npsa.nhs.uk/EasySiteWeb/
getresource.axd?AssetlD=65170&type=full&servicetype=Attachment.

29. See generally David M. Studdert et al., Disclosure Of Medical Injury To Patients:
An ImprobableRisk Management Strategy, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 215 (2007).
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support this fear. Research suggests that a provider's lack of transparency
may actually increase the likelihood that patients will seek legal retribution,
especially when they have not received adequate answers to questions, they
sense an absence of accountability, or they worry that the same mistake
will recur in the future. 30 Thirty-seven percent of patients who sought legal
action said that an explanation and apology would have influenced their
decision to sue their doctor.3 ' Another study found that 24% of patients
filed suit only after discovering that the physician was not honest about
what had happened or that the patient had been intentionally misled.32
Even more to the point, programs that have implemented a disclosure
policy and published their findings demonstrate that it is possible for such
programs to operate without increasing liability claims and costs. 33
Research shows that the three things patients want most in the face of
medical error are: (1) information about what happened; (2) a sincere
apology; and (3) the assurance that measures to prevent the error from
happening to someone else have been implemented.34 Notably absent from
this list of patient's concerns is either the desire to punish health care
providers or to collect large sums of money, although those factors
certainly can become issues, especially if a patient becomes angry and
frustrated with the process of unsuccessfully trying to get answers to
questions.
Studies point to the importance of physician-patient communications
and suggest that communication failures can result in lawsuits.
When
professionals behave in an emotionally distant, brusque, or uninformative

30. Charles Vincent, Magi Young & Angela Phillips, Why Do People Sue Doctors? A
Study ofPatientsandRelatives Taking Legal Action, 343 LANCET 1609, 1609 (1994).
31. Id. at 1612 tbl.5.
32. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Medical Error, 467 CLINICAL
ORTHOPAEDICS & REL. RES. 376, 377 (2009) (citing Gerald B. Hickson et al., Patient
Complaintsand MalpracticeRisk, 287 J. Am. MED. AsS'N 2951 (2002)).
33. Allen Kachalia et al., Liability Claims and Costs Before and After Implementation
of a Medical ErrorDisclosure Program, 153 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 213, 213 (2010); see

Randolf Peto et al., One System's Journey in Creatinga Disclosure and Apology Program,
35 JoINT COMM'N J. QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY 487 (2009) (discussing the implementation

of a disclosure policy in the Baystate Health integrated health care system).
34. Patients'and Physicians'Attitudes, supra note 23, at 1001, 1006; Lucian L. Leape,
Understandingthe Power of Apology: How Saying "I'm Sorry" Helps Heal Patients and
Caregivers, 8 Focus ON PATIENT SAFETY 1 (Nat'l Patient Safety Found., North Adams,
M.A.), 2005, at 1.
35. See generally John D. Banja, Does Medical Error Disclosure Violate the Medical
Malpractice Insurance Cooperation Clause?, in 3 ADVANCES IN PATIENT SAFETY: FROM
RESEARCH TO IMPLEMENTATION 371, 377 (Kerm Henriksen et al. eds., 2005).
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manner, that tone can be a primary factor in encouraging malpractice
actions. 36 Persons harmed by error are more likely to consider litigation if
deprived of the truth when they ask for it or if they feel the physician was
Research has not indicated that
not honest in addressing the incident.
patients are primarily motivated, at least initially, by the prospect of a large
settlement, punishing the physician, or revenge.
WHAT HAPPENS WHEN DOCTORS DISCLOSE?
Health care providers have begun to implement disclosure programs to
inform patients about medical errors and unexpected outcomes. Early
evidence suggests that disclosure and apologies may be effective both in
decreasing the cost of civil actions 3 9 and in improving efforts to prevent
medical errors from recurring. 40
By 2005, sixty-nine percent of health care institutions had error
disclosure policies.4 1 Yet even where these reporting mandates are in
place, there is generally no guidance for when and how the disclosure is to
be achieved or what information is to be disclosed.42 A handful of
programs have implemented their own very high standards for transparency
and disclosure.
Four landmark programs that have implemented disclosure policies
are considered, briefly, here:
Lexington, Kentucky VA
In 1987, over a decade before the Institute of Medicine report, the
Veterans Affairs Medical Center (VA) in Lexington, Kentucky

36. Gerald B. Hickson et al., Patient Complaints And Malpractice Risk, 287 J. AM.
2955 (2002).
37. Carol B. Liebman & Chris Stern Hyman, A Mediation Skills Model To Manage
Disclosure Of Errors And Adverse Events To Patients, 23 HEALTH AFFAIRS 22, 23-24
(2004).
38. But see id.
39. Benjamin Ho & Elaine Liu, What's An Apology Worth? Decomposing the Effect of
Apologies on Medical Malpractice Payments Using State Apology Laws, 8 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. (ISSUE SUPPLEMENT S1) 179, 179 (2011).
40. Matthew Pillsbury, Say Sorry and Save: A PracticalArgument for a Greater Role
for Apologies in Medical Malpractice Law, 1 TRENDS & ISSUES Sci. EVIDENCE 171, 185
(2006).
41. Disclosing Harmful Medical Errors,supra note 7, at 2714.
42. See B.A. Liang, A System of Medical Error Disclosure, 11 QUALITY & SAFETY
MED. Ass'N 2951,

HEALTH CARE 64, 64-65 (2002).
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implemented a radical new policy designed to reduce medical errors,
consisting of "extreme honesty," which was directly contrary to the
entrenched strategy of "deny and defend;" their policy was instead to
disclose, apologize, and compensate.43 They were spurred by having lost
two malpractice claims totaling more than $1.5 million and wanted a more
proactive approach to deal with medical errors.4 Under the new policy,
patients who experienced a harmful error were told about the error and
informed about their rights to file a claim.4 5 Researchers tracked the
medical malpractice claims against the VA from 1990 to 1996 and
compared them to other VA hospitals.46 Results indicated that total
payouts to settle or resolve claims were in the bottom 25% of hospitals,
even though the number of claims was in the top 25%.47 The authors
concluded that an "honest and forthright risk management policy that puts
the patient's interests first" saves money by avoiding "lawsuit preparation,
litigation, court judgments, and settlements at trial." 4 8
The COPICProgram
A Colorado medical malpractice insurance carrier (COPIC) adopted a
disclosure program in conjunction with early offers of compensation,
following three principles: (1) recognize unanticipated events; (2) respond
soon after the event occurs; and (3) resolve any related issues. 49 While the
program had strict criteria for the type of events that it encompassed,
malpractice claims by physicians covered by COPIC dropped by 50% and
settlement costs dropped 23%.5o

43. Steve S. Kraman & Ginny Hamm, Risk Management: Extreme Honesty May Be The
Best Policy, 131 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 963, 964 (1999).

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 965 fig.
Id. at 966.
Richert E. Quinn & Mary C. Eichler, The 3Rs Program: The Colorado Experience,

51 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 709, 709 (2008).

50. Boothman et al., supranote 9, at 147-48.
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Seven PillarsProgram
The "Seven Pillars" disclosure program implemented at UIMMC in
Chicago resulted in 106 disclosure conversations in the first two years and
prompted almost 200 system improvements related to patient safety.
University of Michigan Program
Perhaps the most successful disclosure-and-offer model is exemplified
by the University of Michigan, where a program was instituted with three
goals: (1) "[c]ompensate quickly and fairly when unreasonable medical
care causes injury;" (2) "[d]efend medically reasonable care vigorously;"
and (3) "[r]educe patient injuries (and therefore claims) by learning from
patients' experiences." 52
The experience at the University of Michigan Health System (UMHS)
suggests that open and honest disclosure need not lead to increased
litigation. Since the implementation of the transparency and disclosure
program, the number of new claims fell over the course of seven years
from 136 in 1999 to 61 in 2006, despite corresponding increases in clinical
activity during this period. 53 In addition to the overall reduction in claims,
claims were resolved more quickly with processing time dropping from an
average of 20.3 months to 8 months and litigation costs being cut in half.5 4
Physician satisfaction with the program was astoundingly high: 98% of the
UMHS faculty physicians who responded to a survey perceived a
difference to the approach to malpractice and 98% approved of the
approach." Fifty-five percent said that the approach influenced their
decision to remain employed at the University of Michigan.56
Taken together, these programs demonstrate that a medical center can
successfully implement a disclosure program without increasing
malpractice costs. Disclosure programs may also alleviate some of the
major shortcomings of our current liability system, such as the long delays
for patient compensation and the high administrative costs of defending
medical malpractice claims. Evidence also suggests that disclosure may

51. Timothy B. McDonald et al., Responding to PatientSafety Incidents: The "Seven
Pillars",19 QUALITY & SAFETY HEALTH CARE ell (2010).
52. Boothman et al., supra note 9, at 139.
53. Id. at 143.
54. Id. at 144.
55. Id. at 146.
56. Id.
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help keep non-meritorious claims-claims where there was either no harm
or no medical error-from becoming lawsuits, while meritorious claims
may be settled earlier and for less money." Institutional policies of
openness, which result in increased patient safety efforts, may satisfy
patients for whom litigation was formerly their only alternative for getting
information and an understanding regarding their medical outcome.58
Since the IOM's 1999 report sparked the national conversation about
patient safety, the importance of disclosure has become a frequent topic in
the medical literature. 59 Even though the available data support that
disclosure programs can successfully accomplish not only patient safety
goals but also lower costs and improve patient satisfaction, progress has
been "frustratingly slow," according to two of the authors of that initial
report.60 Given that disclosure is increasingly expected and desired by both
patients and physicians and given the evidence that disclosure is effective
in reducing lawsuits and costs, why are providers slow to change their
responses to medical errors?
A number of barriers to disclosure have been identified.6 Some
physicians assert that patients would prefer not to know about an error
because it diminishes their trust in physicians.62 Some physicians are
reluctant to disclose in cases in which they believe that the patient would
not understand what the physician was telling them, and some physicians
are not inclined to disclose adverse events if the patient would not know
about the event without being told. In addition, there are psychological
reasons for non-disclosure. 64 Admission of guilt may damage a physician's
confidence and self-esteem rendering them less effective, damaging
reputations and perceived authority, and lessening potential for
advancement.6 5 And, of course, it is human nature to avoid difficult

57. See id. at 146, 151-56.
58. See Kachalia et al., supra note 33, at 213 (noting the decrease in the monthly rate of
lawsuits within disclosure programs).
59. See, e.g., id.
60. Lucian L. Leape & Donald M. Berwick, Five Years After To Err Is Human: What
Have We Learned?, 293 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 2384, 2385 (2005).
61. O'Connor et al., supra note 11, at 372 tbl.1; Rick ledema et al., What Prevents
Incident Disclosure, and What Can Be Done To Promote It?, 37 JoINT COMM'N J. ON
QuALITY & PATIENT SAFETY 409, 410 tbl.1 (2011).
62. Id. at 410.
63. Id. at 412.
64. Id. at 410tbl.1.
65. Id.
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10

Phillips-Bute,: Transparency and Disclosure of Medical Errors: It's the Right Thi

2013]

DISCLOSURE OF MEDICAL ERRORS

343

conversations.66 The fear of increased insurance premiums and the
potential loss of malpractice coverage are also real concerns.6 7 Insurance

companies have customarily included "cooperation" clauses requiring
health care providers to cooperate with the insurer's efforts to defend
against a legal claim, and these clauses typically include provisions
prohibiting the insured from admitting fault to a patient.
In 2007, Studdert and his colleagues published a study calling the
disclosure strategy "improbable" and asserting that while the disclosure of
medical errors might ethically be the "right" thing to do, in the long run, it
would increase litigation volume and costs. 69 Because the vast majority of
patients injured by medical error never sue and may not even know that an
error occurred, there is a large pool of potential lawsuits which could be
spurred by disclosure. 70 The authors of the Lexington study criticized
Studdert for being "irresponsible" and for "promoting bad science," 7 and
in 2009, Richard Boothman published an analysis of the University of
Michigan program, which concluded that not only is disclosure and
transparency the ethical approach, but it also makes financial sense,
resulting in decreased claims, shortening processing times, and reducing
litigation costs-exactly the opposite of what Studdert feared would
happen.72 Other researchers have similarly concluded that both utilitarian
arguments and duty-based frameworks provide support for the disclosure of
adverse events. Health care providers may not need to choose between
the financially smart approach and the ethically responsible approachthey may be the same.
LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR THE HEALTH CARE PROVIDER
Patients are more likely to feel the need to seek out an advocate when
they cannot get adequate answers to questions, when they sense an absence

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 410.
Boothman et al., supra note 9, at 128.
Banja, supra note 35, at 371.
Studdert et al., supra note 29, at 225.
Id. at 222-23.
Steve S. Kraman & Ginny Hamm, Letter To The Editor, Bad Modeling?, 26
HEALTH AFFAIRS 903, 903 (2007).
72. Boothman et al., supra note 9, at 143-46.
73. Denise M. Dudzinski et al., The Disclosure Dilemma-Large-ScaleAdverse Events,
363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 978, 979 (2010).
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of accountability, or when they worry that other patients might experience
the same mistake.74
Despite the trend in the consciousness of the medical community that
disclosure is the right approach, there is still reluctance on the part of
providers to embrace full disclosure programs. Research shows that
physicians are primarily concerned about the legal consequences of
disclosing errors, including the discoverability and admissibility in court of
their disclosures.75 Physicians lack awareness about what legal protections
are in place, are concerned that the protections are too weak, and believe
that the laws have limited applicability.76
Apologies
Injured patients view apologies as an appropriate ethical response in
the case of medical error.77 Apologies can facilitate healing and provide
closure. An apology can promote the early resolution of a dispute and
result in significant savings in legal bills, as well as a reduced settlement
amount for the physician or insurance provider.
Patients want to hear apologies and explanations, and physicians claim
to want to give them.7 9 Although physicians report they are committed to
being truthful with patients, fear of litigation limits what they tell patients
about mistakes that have resulted in harm.80 To encourage this desire for
communication, thirty-four states and the District of Columbia have
adopted "apology" laws and nine states have adopted "disclosure" laws to
provide protection for those conversations.' Thirteen states have neither
apology laws nor disclosure laws. 82

74. See Vincent, Young & Phillips,supra note 30, at 1612.
75. Jane Garbut et al., Lost Opportunities: How Physicians Communicate About
MedicalErrors, 27 HEALTH AFFAIRS 246, 252 (2008).
76. David M. Studdert, Donella Piper & Rick ledema, Legal Aspects of Open
Disclosure II: Attitudes of Health Professionals-Findingsfrom a National Survey, 193
MED. J. AUSTL. 351, 353 (2010).

77. Kathleen M. Mazor et al., Health Plan Members' Views about Disclosure of
Medical Errors, 140 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 409, 416 (2004).

78. Benjamin Ho & Elaine Liu, Does Sorry Work? The Impact of Apology Laws on
Medical Malpractice 3, 24 (Johnson Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 04-2011, 2010),
availableat http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1744225.
79. Patients'AndPhysicians'Attitudes,supra note 23, at 1003.
80. Id. at 1006.
81. Mastroianni et al., supra note 20, at 1612.
82. Id.
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In 2010, a survey of state apology and disclosure statutes found that,
while they vary widely between states, these laws did not provide overall
adequate protection for full disclosure.83 An expression of regret is only
one aspect of a comprehensive disclosure. Other important parts of
disclosure are details about what happened, the possibility of remediation,
and overall process and systems changes. Even when apology statutes
apply, they will sometimes not apply to accompanying statements
explaining the event or its causes. 84 These remain potentially discoverable
and admissible in legal proceedings.
Apology Statutes
Patients see apologies as a necessary part of the resolution process, but
lawyers and insurance carriers have typically discouraged expressions of
sympathy out of concern that these could be used in litigation.
Yet
apologies rank in the top three things that patients want in the event of a
harmful medical error.87 Research is overwhelmingly favorable toward the
use of apologies, 8 8 which can increase the likelihood that a settlement offer
will be accepted and decrease the costs of litigation. 89 Even in the face of
such evidence, health care providers may be hesitant to apologize for a
medical error in the belief that an apology may be regarded as an admission
of liability, thus making it more likely that a patient will sue. In fact, this
concern is valid; at common law, an apology that admits fault is admissible
to prove liability. 90 The Federal Rules of Evidence, adopted by most states,
do allow overt admissions to be admissible in court to prove negligence,
even if the apology itself is inadmissible. 9 '

83. Id. at 1613.
84. Id. ("These laws suggest that portions of a statement that explain or acknowledge
responsibility-such as, "I'm sorry I hurt you," or, "I'm sorry I made a mistake when I
administeredthe wrong medication"-couldbe used in litigation.").
8 5. Id.
86. See JoINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., supra note 27, at
27-28 ("Insurers, too, are increasingly urging apologies.").
87. Patients'and Physicians'Attitudes,supranote 23, at 1006.
88. See, e.g., id.
89. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Settlement Levers, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 333, 337 n.18 (2006).
90. See generally AM. COLL. LEGAL MED., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SURVIVAL
HANDBOOK (S. Sandy Sandbar et al. eds., 1st ed. 2007).
91. FED.R. EvID. 801(d)(2).
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To address this concern, over two-thirds of states have enacted
apology laws, which make all apologies inadmissible in civil actions.9 2
Apology statutes differ by state but can generally be categorized by what
type of communication is protected. Some states (e.g., Florida, Hawaii,
Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Washington)
specify that a statement of fault is "not inadmissible" as evidence-these
states block only the admission of statements of sympathy and regret but
not any acknowledgement of fault. 93 Under such a statute, "I'm sorry you
got hurt" is protected, but "I'm sorry that I hurt you" is not, and "this is
how you got hurt" is definitely not. However, patients are unlikely to
consider "I'm sorry you got hurt" to be a full apology, and hearing an
incomplete sentiment may do more to anger than to assuage the patient
because explanations perceived as incomplete or evasive can create
additional distress. 94
The second type of apology statute protects the specific information
related to the cause of the incident or fault, as well as the expression of
regret.95 For example, Colorado's law specifically applies to and protects
statements of fault that are offered as part of an apology. 96
The North Carolina apology statute is an example of an intermediate
level of protection.9 7 The statute offers protection for statements made by a
health care provider apologizing for an adverse outcome and, additionally,
applies to offers to provide corrective or remedial treatment, as well as
gratuitous acts to help affected persons.98 It does not, however, protect any
admissions of fault or acknowledgement of responsibility. The statute
reads as follows:
Statements by a health care provider apologizing for an adverse outcome in
medical treatment, offers to undertake corrective or remedial treatment or
actions, and gratuitous acts to assist affected persons shall not be
admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct by the health care
provider in an action brought under Article IB of Chapter 90 of the General
Statutes.99
92. Mastroianni et al., supra note 20, at 1612.
93. Id. at 1612-13, 1619 n.39.
94. Patients' and Physicians' Attitudes, supra note 23, at 1005; see generally Leape,
supra note 34.
95. Mastroianni et al., supra note 20, at 1613.

96.
97.
98.
99.

Boothman et al., supra note 9, at 132.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-413 (2011).
Id.
Id.
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Because the majority of states' apology laws only protect the
expression of regret and do not cover any accompanying explanation or

admission of fault, 00 apology laws by themselves provide incomplete
protection for a physician to reasonably feel safe enough to engage in full
disclosure of an error which results in harm.
DisclosureLaws

What about laws mandating disclosure? As of 2010, seven states
passed mandatory disclosure laws, and two passed discretionary disclosure
statutes.o10 The mandatory disclosure laws require health care facilities, but
not individual providers, to notify patients of unanticipated outcomes of
medical care. 0 2 One example of a mandatory disclosure law is New
Jersey's "Patient Safety Act," which creates a legal duty to immediately
disclose medical errors to patients who are harmed by them.'
This
mandated communication between health care providers and patients
requires that when a patient is a victim of a "serious preventable adverse
event[]"--defined as one that results in death, loss of a body part,
disability, or loss of bodily function lasting more than seven days, or still
present at the time of discharge-the medical providers have twenty-four
hours after the discovery to notify the patient that a mistake has occurred or
the provider is subject to a fine of $1,000 or $5,000.104
Out of the nine states with disclosure statutes, only six also provide
legal protection regarding subsequent use of the statements during
litigation.'05 Some studies have concluded that the disclosure laws have
overall "structural weaknesses" that may actually discourage
comprehensive disclosures and apologies and weaken the law's impact on
malpractice suits; "[d]isclosure laws do not require, and most apology laws
do not protect, the key information that patients want communicated to
them following an unanticipated outcome." 0 6 Doctors tend to concur. In
2010, Studdert and Richardson published a survey of health professionals
discussing the legal aspects of open disclosure in jurisdictions that have

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Mastroianni et al., supra note 20, at 1612-13.
Id. at 1614.
Id.
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2H-12.23 to -12.25 (2004).
Id. §§ 26:211-12.25(a), (d); N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8:43E-3.4(a)(15), 8:43E-10.7(b)

(2013).

105. Mastroianni et al., supra note 20, at 1614.
106. Id.
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apology laws and found that doctors perceive the current protections to be
inadequate in the medical malpractice arena.o 7
Disclosure laws require only a minimum statement that an
unanticipated outcome occurred, and the apology statutes mostly protect
only an expression of sympathy.' 0 8 These are minimal standards and not
likely to meet patient expectations about disclosure and transparency.
Where legal protections are unclear or inadequate, health care providers
who are uncertain about their legal protections may engage in vague,
general expressions of sympathy and very brief indications that an
unexpected event occurred-without full explanations or disclosure. These
laws may not adequately offer either patients or health care providers the
opportunity for frank and open conversations that both claim to want.
Worse, they may be encouraging, rather than discouraging, litigation.109 If
apology and disclosure statutes are inadequate to provide health care
providers with the protection they need, what accounts for the fact that
some disclosure programs appear to be successful in the eyes of both
patients and physicians while others are not?
Patients typically say they want to know about all errors that occur,
how and why the event occurred, and what is being done to prevent
mistakes from recurring.110 Yet when disclosure is done poorly or
incompletely, the result is not what anyone wants-the patient is not
satisfied and the health care provider may have put himself at increased
risk of litigation."' Physicians also increasingly claim that, at least in
principle, they want to be open with patients because it is the right thing to
do.1 2 Yet these conversations are still the exception and not the rule.
Despite the success of disclosure programs at the University of Michigan,
at the Lexington VA, at the University of Chicago, and at the COPIC
program-all of which indicate that it is possible to develop a disclosure
program which satisfies both patients and providers-it is not sufficient to
merely mandate disclosure. Fear of litigation, discomfort with having the
difficult conversation, insecurity about the most effective way to disclose,

107. David M. Studdert & Mark W. Richardson, Legal Aspects of Open Disclosure: A
Review ofAustralian Law, 193 MED. J. AUSTL. 273, 275 (2010).
108. Mastroianni et al., supra note 20, at 1615.
109. Id. at 1616.
110. Patients'and Physicians'Attitudes,supra note 23, at 1001.
111. See Lola Butcher, Lawyers Say "Sorry" May Sink You in Court, 32 PHYsICIAN
ExEcuTIvE 20, 22-23 (2006).
112. Patients'and Physicians'Attitudes,supra note 23, at 1003.
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and fear of embarrassment that patients will not respond well all remain
obstacles.' 13
Abroad, Australia has implemented a national Open Disclosure
Standard, which has been in place since 2003.114 All states within Australia
have apology statutes to protect health care providers."15 Yet surveys of
physicians indicate continuing uncertainty and lack of awareness about the
legal protections in place,1 6 and surveys of patients indicate that the
disclosure process frequently does not meet their needs."' Surveys of
patients find that:
[M]ost patients and family members felt that the health service incident
disclosure rarely met their needs and expectations. They expected better
preparation for incident disclosure, more shared dialogue about what went
wrong, more follow-up support, input into when the time was ripe for
closure, and more information about subsequent improvement in
process. 118
A procedure that consists of informing a patient that an error occurred,
without any accompanying support or follow-up, may meet the minimal
disclosure requirements of the statute but is not an adequate disclosure
program.
In 2007, Gallagher speculated that within a decade, "full and frank
The article
disclosure" of medical errors would be the norm.119
acknowledged the need for provider education about legal protections and
hypothesized that organizations would do one of two things: either provide
disclosure training and coaches to support health care providers when a
disclosure was warranted or, in contrast, avoid the risks of conducting poor
disclosures altogether by removing the clinical provider from the equation
and using surrogates, like risk managers, to interact with patients.1 2 0 The
problem with this latter model is that it does not address the needs of the

See DisclosingHarmfulMedical Errors,supra note 7, at 2713, 2716.
Id. at 2714.
Studdert, Piper & ledema, supra note 76, 352.
Id. at 352-54.
Rick ledema et al., Patients'and Family Members'Experiences of Open Disclosure
Following Adverse Events, 20 INT'L J. FOR QUALITY HEALTH CARE 421, 430 (2008).
118. Rick ledema et al., Patients'andFamily Members' Views on How CliniciansEnact
and How They Should Enact Incident Disclosure: The "100 Patient Stories" Qualitative
Study 1 (BMJ, Paper No. 343:d4423, 2011), available at http://www.bmj.com/highwire/
filestream/388298/field highwire-articlepdf/0/bmj.d4423.
119. DisclosingHarmful MedicalErrors, supra note 7, at 2718.
120. Id. at 2717.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
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physician to gain closure over an incident, and it does nothing to heal the
relationship between the physician and the injured patient.
What kind of context makes the difference between a successful and a
problematic disclosure? One type of program that is designed to more fully
meet the needs of both patients is the collaborative law model. For the
patients, it provides complete disclosure, apology, and the opportunity to
ask questions, emotional support, and legal representation; for physicians,
it provides legal protections against liability, a context for initiating a
difficult conversation, and emotional support for putting the physician's
professional reputation at risk. The model includes lawyers and mental
health coaches for patients and health care providers, as well as mediators,
for a collaborative conference where all the parties meet to share
information and ask questions. 12 1
THE COLLABORATIVE LAW MODEL

Collaborative law is a structured, voluntary, cooperative dispute
resolution process which involves a series of meetings with parties and
attorneys to work toward a resolution uniquely tailored to the facts of the
individual case and not limited by legal remedies. 12 2 Collaborative law has
primarily been used in the context of family law, in which it has been
judged to be highly effective.1 2 3 Research shows that "[p]arties to a
problem-solving approach are . .. more likely to be satisfied with the
outcome because of their involvement in fashioning it."l24 A problemsolving process such as collaborative law can often effectively be used in
difficult cases in which there is a relationship to be preserved or
transformed.
Research conducted by the International Academy of
Collaborative Professionals from October 16, 2006 through August 24,
2009 showed that 86% of 793 reported collaborative law cases settled with
an agreement on all issues; an additional 3% of cases reconciled. 12 5 As of

121. See generally Kathleen Clark, The Use of Collaborative Law in Medical Error
Situations, THE HEALTH LAWYER, June 2007, at 19.
122. Id. at 19.
123. J. Herbie DiFonzo, A Vision for Collaborative Practice: The Final Report of the
Hofstra Collaborative Law Conference, 38 HOFsTRA L. REV. 569, 571, 600 (2009)
(recognizing the origins of collaborative law practice in the context of family law and its
expansion into other areas of civil law).
124. Linda K. Wray, CollaborativePractice:Lawyer as Negotiator and Problem-Solver,
FAM. L. F., (Minn. State Bar Ass'n, Minneapolis, Minn.) Spring/Summer 2011, at 19, 22.
125. Id.
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May 19, 2010, there have been no ethical complaints or lawsuits filed
against collaborative attorneys.12 6
The application of the principles of collaborative law to health care
disputes has the potential to be tremendously advantageous to patients who
might otherwise go unrepresented, uncompensated, and uninformed about
what happened to them. It provides emotional and legal support to both
patients and physicians in the form of coaches and collaborative law
attorneys, as well as a supportive context in which to have a potentially
difficult conversation.1 27 In addition, the collaborative law approach
provides a context in which a number of additional legal protections are put
in place for the health care provider.
Under the IACT program,12 8 North Carolina's only collaborative law
program for health care disputes, the legal protections for the health care
providers can be identified as follows: the participation agreement's
confidentiality clause; the agreement of all parties not to be involved in
future proceedings; the stipulation that parties mutually and voluntarily
agree to be governed by certain applicable statutes; the health care
settlement agreement; the North Carolina statute applicable to mediation
negotiations; rules of evidence which exclude compromise and offers to
compromise; and the collaborative law statute.12 9
The CollaborativeLaw Statute
North Carolina is one of four states to adopt a statute that applies to
communications that occur during collaborative law conferences. 3 0 The
statute applies to cases of separation and divorce and does not specifically
apply to health care disputes.13' However, by signing a participation
agreement, the parties in a health care collaborative conference mutually
agree to be governed by the collaborative law statute.13 2 The statute states,
in part:
126. Id. at 32.
127. Id. at 25.
128. JESSICA Scorr, IACT PROGRAM: A MEDICAL DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY
PROGRAM 3-4 (2011), available at http://www.iactprogram.com/wp-content/uploads/201 1/
08/Copyrighted-IACT-White-Paper5.pdf.
129. See generally id.
130. Rachel M. Zahorsky, ABA Rejects Proposed Measure for Collaborative Law
Guidelines, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 9, 2011, 1:28 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
the aba house of delegates-rejected-resolution110b/.
131. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-77 (2011) (arising in the section concerning divorce,
alimony, and child support).
132. Id.
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All statements, communications, and work product made or arising from a
collaborative law procedure are confidential and are inadmissible in any
court proceeding.... All communications and work product of any
attorney or third-party expert hired for purposes of participating in a
collaborative law procedure shall be privileged and inadmissible in any
court proceeding, except by agreement of the parties. 133
Collaborative law requires the parties and their attorneys to sign a
participation agreement, which is a prerequisite to participation in the
process and provides for confidentiality among all parties. One clause of
the IACT Program's Participation Agreement reads as follows:
Participants agree to ... [f]ull, open and honest disclosure, and in
exchange, agree that all statements, communications, and work product
during the Collaborative Law Process, whether made by Participants,
neutral experts, and IACT Program administrators, are to be kept
confidential and used only to facilitate resolution during this Process. 134
A collaborative lawyer agrees to withdraw from representation of a
client if the client commences litigation on the matter or if a client refuses
to comply with the disclosure requirements.13 5 Barring the lawyers from
pursuing litigation ensures that parties adhere to interest-based negotiations
rather than positional bargaining. Because the litigation pathway is not
available to them, lawyers are encouraged to act more collaboratively and
work cooperatively to help both parties obtain a satisfactory settlement and
some measure of closure. Clients are advised that, in the event that either
party pursues litigation, the attorneys for both parties are disqualified.3 6
Because clients must retain new counsel if they decide to pursue litigation,
the new attorney is not aware of any disclosure that occurred during the
collaborative process, and the confidentiality of the process precludes him
from finding out what was discussed.
Another provision of the IACT program's participation agreement
states that all non-party participants together with their work product are
prohibited from involvement in future proceedings.' 37 This provision
allows information, including the opinion of a neutral medical expert, to be
shared freely during the collaborative discussions without the fear that the
information gained will then be used as the basis for litigation.
133. Id.
134. IACT Program Collaborative Process Participation Agreement 1 (on file with
author).
135. DiFonzo, supra note 123, at 579.
136. Id.
137. IACT Program Collaborative Process Participation Agreement 2 (on file with
author).
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In addition to the adoption of the collaborative law statute, the
participation agreement signed by the parties contains a clause through
which the parties agree to be governed by certain additional statutes, one of
these being the mediation negotiation statute.'3 8 The privilege accorded to
conversations that happen during mediations is relatively new. An
increasing number of states have adopted the Uniform Mediation Act, 3 9
and all states have enacted statutes or rules to protect communications
made during mediation from disclosure in legal proceedings. 140
Confidentiality is necessary to the success of mediation because, otherwise,
parties would be hesitant to speak freely if statements could be used against
them in trial. The mediation privilege encourages open discussions. In
addition, the mediator is protected from being subpoenaed, which protects
the mediator's neutrality.141
Under the North Carolina statute, statements made during mediation
are not subject to discovery and are not admissible in any proceeding in the
action.142 In addition, the mediator may not be compelled to testify
regarding statements made during the mediation.143
While a collaborative conference is not a mediation per se, if a
mediator presides over the conference, the process falls under the umbrella
of mediation.14 4 Under the North Carolina statutes, mediation is defined as
"an informal process conducted by a mediator
with the objective of helping
45
parties voluntarily settle their dispute."'1
North Carolina's Rule of Evidence 408 is virtually identical to Rule
408 in the Federal Rules of Evidence, which every state has adopted.146 It
provides that if, during a settlement negotiation, a party either makes an
offer to compromise or accepts a compromise, the offer cannot be later
used in court as evidence to prove negligence. 147 The adoption of Rule 408
138. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-110 (2011).
139. Matt Brown, Legislation: Where the Uniform Mediation Act Stands in the States
(Web), INT'L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOL., http://www.cpradr.org/Resources/

ALLCPRArticles/tabid/265/ID/239/Legislation-Where-the-Uniform-Mediation-Act-Standsin-the-States-Web.aspx (last visited Sept. 30, 2013).
140. Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Construction and Application of State Mediation
Privilege, 32 A.L.R.6TH 285, 301 (2008).
141. Id.
142. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-110(a).
143. Id. § 8-110(b).
144. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-106.3(12).
145. Id.
146. Compare id §8C-408 with FED. R. EvID. 408.
147. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-408.
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changed the North Carolina practice that allowed a "distinct admission of
an independent fact" made during compromise negotiations to be offered as
evidence.14 8 However, the rule is clear that just because a statement is
made during settlement discussions does not disqualify the information
itself from being used in a subsequent lawsuit if that information was
"otherwise discoverable." 1 4 9 In addition, the information may be used for a
purpose other than to show liability, such as to show bias or prejudice.so
This limitation on confidentiality must be carefully explained to clients by
their attorneys-just because information arises in a protected setting does
not preclude it from being pursued in another legal setting.
Finally, at the end of the collaborative conference, parties sign a health
care settlement agreement which is a mutual release as to all claims relating
to the matter at issue in the collaborative conference(s). 5 Once the parties
have created an acceptable settlement, the matter is resolved, and the option
to pursue litigation is waived.15 2
CONCLUSION

A culture change is underway. Transparency and disclosure programs
are increasingly a part of the medical landscape, and the early results of
those programs tell us that the context of the conversations is critical to
their success or failure. Patients increasingly report that they want and
expect to be told about mistakes. This includes receiving both a disclosure
and an apology when an adverse event occurs. An effective disclosure
program such as a collaborative law program has mechanisms for
providing information, acknowledgement, apology, and appropriate
compensation. The additional legal protections that can be incorporated
into a collaborative law program make it possible to change the focus of
how we address medical errors by removing the punitive aspect of a
lawsuit and replacing it with a sense of shared responsibility for improving
patient outcomes. Because doctors and patients both need support after a
medical error has occurred, and because hospitals desire safer processes,
everyone benefits from a paradigm shift in which openness, compassion,
and transparency are the ultimate focus.
148. Dean P. Loven, Walker J. Blakey, & Glen Weissenberger, NORTH CAROLINA
EVIDENCE: 2012 COURTROOM MANUAL, ch. no. 408 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2012).
149. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-408.
150. Id.
151. IACT Program Collaborative Process Participation Agreement I (on file with
author).
152. Id.
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